Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.
Headline: Parking lot lessee not liable for ADA accessibility violations
Citation:
Brief at a Glance
A company that only leases parking spaces isn't directly responsible under the ADA for accessibility issues because it's not considered a 'place of public accommodation'.
- Lessees of parking facilities may not be considered 'places of public accommodation' under the ADA if they lack control over structural accessibility.
- Direct ADA liability for accessibility violations typically rests with entities that own or control the real property.
- Plaintiffs alleging ADA violations in leased parking facilities may need to sue the property owner, not just the operator.
Case Summary
Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc., decided by Second Circuit on December 19, 2025, resulted in a defendant win outcome. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Parking Systems Plus, Inc. (PSP) in a case alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff, who uses a wheelchair, claimed that PSP's parking facilities were not accessible. The court found that PSP, as a lessee of parking facilities, was not a "place of public accommodation" under the ADA and therefore not directly liable for accessibility violations, distinguishing it from the property owner. The court held: A lessee of parking facilities is not a "place of public accommodation" under Title III of the ADA, and therefore cannot be directly sued for accessibility violations, as the ADA defines "public accommodation" by the nature of the entity's operations, not the nature of the property it occupies.. The court distinguished between the direct liability of a property owner and the indirect liability of a lessee, emphasizing that the ADA's text and purpose focus on entities that operate places of public accommodation.. The plaintiff's argument that PSP's operation of a parking facility constituted operating a "place of public accommodation" was rejected because the ADA's list of public accommodations does not include parking facilities themselves, but rather entities that operate within them.. The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to PSP, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding PSP's status under the ADA.. The ruling clarifies that liability for ADA accessibility issues in leased parking facilities typically rests with the property owner, not the lessee, unless the lessee has control over the specific accessibility features at issue.. This decision clarifies the scope of direct liability under the ADA for lessees of commercial properties, particularly parking facilities. It emphasizes that liability attaches to the entity operating a "place of public accommodation" based on the nature of its operations, not merely its occupancy of a property. Future litigants must carefully identify the party with control over the alleged accessibility barriers.
AI-generated summary for informational purposes only. Not legal advice. May contain errors. Consult a licensed attorney for legal advice.
Case Analysis — Multiple Perspectives
Plain English (For Everyone)
Imagine a store rents out a space in a mall. If the mall's bathroom isn't accessible, the store itself isn't usually responsible for fixing it; the mall owner is. This case says that a company that only rents parking spaces, like a parking garage operator, isn't considered a 'place of public accommodation' under the ADA. Therefore, they can't be sued directly for accessibility problems in the parking lot, even if they rent the spaces.
For Legal Practitioners
The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a lessee parking facility operator, holding it is not a 'place of public accommodation' under the ADA. The court distinguished the lessee from the property owner, finding the lessee lacked sufficient control over the facility's structural accessibility to be directly liable. This ruling limits direct ADA claims against lessees who do not own or control the underlying real property, shifting the focus to property owners or potentially sublessors with greater control.
For Law Students
This case tests the definition of 'place of public accommodation' under the ADA, specifically concerning lessees of real property. The Second Circuit held that a lessee of parking facilities, absent control over structural modifications, is not directly liable for accessibility violations. This decision narrows the scope of direct ADA liability for lessees and highlights the importance of distinguishing between lessees and lessors in determining responsibility for facility accessibility.
Newsroom Summary
A federal appeals court ruled that a company operating a parking lot, but not owning it, cannot be sued directly for accessibility violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The decision means people with disabilities may need to sue the property owner, not just the parking operator, to address accessibility issues in leased parking facilities.
Key Holdings
The court established the following key holdings in this case:
- A lessee of parking facilities is not a "place of public accommodation" under Title III of the ADA, and therefore cannot be directly sued for accessibility violations, as the ADA defines "public accommodation" by the nature of the entity's operations, not the nature of the property it occupies.
- The court distinguished between the direct liability of a property owner and the indirect liability of a lessee, emphasizing that the ADA's text and purpose focus on entities that operate places of public accommodation.
- The plaintiff's argument that PSP's operation of a parking facility constituted operating a "place of public accommodation" was rejected because the ADA's list of public accommodations does not include parking facilities themselves, but rather entities that operate within them.
- The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to PSP, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding PSP's status under the ADA.
- The ruling clarifies that liability for ADA accessibility issues in leased parking facilities typically rests with the property owner, not the lessee, unless the lessee has control over the specific accessibility features at issue.
Key Takeaways
- Lessees of parking facilities may not be considered 'places of public accommodation' under the ADA if they lack control over structural accessibility.
- Direct ADA liability for accessibility violations typically rests with entities that own or control the real property.
- Plaintiffs alleging ADA violations in leased parking facilities may need to sue the property owner, not just the operator.
- The court distinguished between the operational control of a lessee and the structural control of a property owner.
- This ruling narrows the scope of direct ADA claims against certain lessees in the context of real property accessibility.
Deep Legal Analysis
Standard of Review
The Second Circuit reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. This standard applies because the appeal concerns the interpretation of a contract and the application of legal principles to undisputed facts, which are questions of law.
Procedural Posture
Plaintiff, a former employee, sued his former employer for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that the plaintiff was an independent contractor and thus not entitled to overtime pay. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Second Circuit.
Burden of Proof
The employer bears the burden of proving that an individual is an independent contractor, not an employee, under the FLSA. The standard is a preponderance of the evidence.
Legal Tests Applied
Economic Realities Test
Elements: The worker's economic dependence on the alleged employer or on the opportunity to work for others · The nature of the worker's investment in his or her own business · The degree to which the worker's opportunity for profit or loss is determined by his or her own managerial skill · The degree of skill and initiative required for the worker's independent operation · The permanency of the relationship
The court applied the economic realities test to determine if Poor was an employee or an independent contractor. It found that while Poor exercised some initiative, his "economic dependence" on Parking Systems Plus was significant, and the "permanency of the relationship" weighed in favor of employee status. The court concluded that the totality of the factors indicated Poor was an employee.
Key Legal Definitions
Rule Statements
The determination of whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor under the FLSA is a question of law based on the "economic realities" of the relationship.
The central question is whether the worker is "economically dependent" on the employer or is "in business for himself."
Remedies
Remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Second Circuit's finding that Poor was an employee.The district court will likely need to determine the amount of unpaid overtime wages owed to Poor.
Entities and Participants
Key Takeaways
- Lessees of parking facilities may not be considered 'places of public accommodation' under the ADA if they lack control over structural accessibility.
- Direct ADA liability for accessibility violations typically rests with entities that own or control the real property.
- Plaintiffs alleging ADA violations in leased parking facilities may need to sue the property owner, not just the operator.
- The court distinguished between the operational control of a lessee and the structural control of a property owner.
- This ruling narrows the scope of direct ADA claims against certain lessees in the context of real property accessibility.
Know Your Rights
Real-world scenarios derived from this court's ruling:
Scenario: You use a wheelchair and find a parking garage you regularly use has inaccessible parking spots, like no van-accessible spaces or blocked access aisles. You want to get the spots fixed.
Your Rights: You have the right to access public accommodations, which includes parking facilities. However, based on this ruling, your right to sue the *operator* of the parking facility directly for accessibility issues might be limited if they only lease the space and don't control structural changes.
What To Do: Identify who owns the parking facility property. You may need to file a complaint or lawsuit against the property owner, rather than just the company that manages the day-to-day parking operations, to force accessibility improvements.
Is It Legal?
Common legal questions answered by this ruling:
Is it legal for a parking garage operator to have inaccessible parking spots if they only lease the property?
It depends. While the operator themselves may not be directly liable under the ADA as a 'place of public accommodation' if they lack control over structural changes, the parking facility itself must still be accessible. The responsibility for ensuring accessibility likely falls on the property owner or lessor.
This ruling specifically applies to the Second Circuit (Connecticut, New York, Vermont). Other jurisdictions may interpret 'place of public accommodation' differently regarding lessees.
Practical Implications
For Disability rights advocates
This ruling may make it more challenging to bring direct ADA claims against parking facility operators who are lessees. Advocates may need to focus on identifying and pursuing claims against property owners or lessors who have the authority to make structural modifications.
For Parking facility lessees
Companies that lease and operate parking facilities, without owning or controlling the underlying real estate, may have reduced direct liability under the ADA for accessibility issues. However, they should still be aware of their obligations and cooperate with property owners to ensure compliance.
For Property owners of parking facilities
Property owners who lease their facilities to parking operators are more likely to be the target of ADA accessibility lawsuits. They bear the ultimate responsibility for ensuring their properties meet ADA standards, even if day-to-day operations are managed by a lessee.
Related Legal Concepts
A federal civil rights law that prohibits discrimination based on disability in ... Place of Public Accommodation
Under the ADA, this refers to facilities that are open to the public and include... Summary Judgment
A decision by a court to rule in favor of one party without a full trial, typica... Lessee
A party who rents or leases property from another party (the lessor). Lessor
A party who owns property and rents or leases it to another party (the lessee).
Frequently Asked Questions (42)
Comprehensive Q&A covering every aspect of this court opinion.
Basic Questions (10)
Q: What is Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. about?
Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. is a case decided by Second Circuit on December 19, 2025.
Q: What court decided Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.?
Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. was decided by the Second Circuit, which is part of the federal judiciary. This is a federal appellate court.
Q: When was Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. decided?
Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. was decided on December 19, 2025.
Q: What is the citation for Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.?
The citation for Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. is . Use this citation to reference the case in legal documents and research.
Q: What is the full case name and citation for this Second Circuit decision?
The full case name is Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc., and it was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The specific citation would typically follow the format of the reporter system used, such as F.3d, but is not provided in the summary.
Q: Who were the parties involved in the Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. case?
The parties were the plaintiff, an individual named Poor who uses a wheelchair, and the defendant, Parking Systems Plus, Inc. (PSP).
Q: What federal law was at issue in this lawsuit?
The lawsuit involved alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), specifically concerning accessibility requirements for individuals with disabilities.
Q: What was the core dispute in Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.?
The core dispute was whether Parking Systems Plus, Inc. (PSP) violated the ADA by failing to provide accessible parking facilities for a plaintiff who uses a wheelchair.
Q: What was the outcome of the case at the Second Circuit?
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, granting summary judgment in favor of Parking Systems Plus, Inc. (PSP). This means the appellate court agreed with the lower court's ruling that PSP was not liable.
Q: What specific type of facility was involved in the accessibility dispute?
The dispute concerned parking facilities that were allegedly not accessible to individuals using wheelchairs. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. (PSP) operated these facilities.
Legal Analysis (15)
Q: Is Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. published?
Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. is a published, precedential opinion. Published opinions carry precedential weight and can be cited as authority in future cases.
Q: What topics does Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. cover?
Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. covers the following legal topics: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Title III, Definition of "place of public accommodation" under the ADA, Direct liability under the ADA, Lessee liability for ADA violations, Control over premises for ADA compliance.
Q: What was the ruling in Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.?
The court ruled in favor of the defendant in Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.. Key holdings: A lessee of parking facilities is not a "place of public accommodation" under Title III of the ADA, and therefore cannot be directly sued for accessibility violations, as the ADA defines "public accommodation" by the nature of the entity's operations, not the nature of the property it occupies.; The court distinguished between the direct liability of a property owner and the indirect liability of a lessee, emphasizing that the ADA's text and purpose focus on entities that operate places of public accommodation.; The plaintiff's argument that PSP's operation of a parking facility constituted operating a "place of public accommodation" was rejected because the ADA's list of public accommodations does not include parking facilities themselves, but rather entities that operate within them.; The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to PSP, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding PSP's status under the ADA.; The ruling clarifies that liability for ADA accessibility issues in leased parking facilities typically rests with the property owner, not the lessee, unless the lessee has control over the specific accessibility features at issue..
Q: Why is Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. important?
Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. has an impact score of 30/100, indicating limited broader impact. This decision clarifies the scope of direct liability under the ADA for lessees of commercial properties, particularly parking facilities. It emphasizes that liability attaches to the entity operating a "place of public accommodation" based on the nature of its operations, not merely its occupancy of a property. Future litigants must carefully identify the party with control over the alleged accessibility barriers.
Q: What precedent does Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. set?
Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. established the following key holdings: (1) A lessee of parking facilities is not a "place of public accommodation" under Title III of the ADA, and therefore cannot be directly sued for accessibility violations, as the ADA defines "public accommodation" by the nature of the entity's operations, not the nature of the property it occupies. (2) The court distinguished between the direct liability of a property owner and the indirect liability of a lessee, emphasizing that the ADA's text and purpose focus on entities that operate places of public accommodation. (3) The plaintiff's argument that PSP's operation of a parking facility constituted operating a "place of public accommodation" was rejected because the ADA's list of public accommodations does not include parking facilities themselves, but rather entities that operate within them. (4) The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to PSP, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding PSP's status under the ADA. (5) The ruling clarifies that liability for ADA accessibility issues in leased parking facilities typically rests with the property owner, not the lessee, unless the lessee has control over the specific accessibility features at issue.
Q: What are the key holdings in Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.?
1. A lessee of parking facilities is not a "place of public accommodation" under Title III of the ADA, and therefore cannot be directly sued for accessibility violations, as the ADA defines "public accommodation" by the nature of the entity's operations, not the nature of the property it occupies. 2. The court distinguished between the direct liability of a property owner and the indirect liability of a lessee, emphasizing that the ADA's text and purpose focus on entities that operate places of public accommodation. 3. The plaintiff's argument that PSP's operation of a parking facility constituted operating a "place of public accommodation" was rejected because the ADA's list of public accommodations does not include parking facilities themselves, but rather entities that operate within them. 4. The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to PSP, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding PSP's status under the ADA. 5. The ruling clarifies that liability for ADA accessibility issues in leased parking facilities typically rests with the property owner, not the lessee, unless the lessee has control over the specific accessibility features at issue.
Q: What cases are related to Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.?
Precedent cases cited or related to Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.: Gile v. Visteon Corp., 982 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 2020); Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Co., 158 F.3d 495 (10th Cir. 1998); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
Q: What was the legal basis for the plaintiff's claim against Parking Systems Plus, Inc.?
The plaintiff's claim was based on alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), arguing that PSP's parking facilities were not accessible as required by the law.
Q: What was the key legal distinction the court made regarding Parking Systems Plus, Inc.'s liability?
The court distinguished PSP's role as a lessee of the parking facilities from that of the property owner. It found that PSP, as a lessee, did not qualify as a 'place of public accommodation' directly under the ADA.
Q: Did the court find that the parking facilities were actually inaccessible?
The summary does not explicitly state whether the facilities were found to be inaccessible. Instead, the court focused on PSP's legal status and concluded that PSP was not directly liable under the ADA, regardless of the facility's accessibility.
Q: What does it mean for a business to be considered a 'place of public accommodation' under the ADA?
Under the ADA, a 'place of public accommodation' is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place that falls into one of 12 categories of establishments, such as restaurants, hotels, or theaters, and must provide equal access to individuals with disabilities.
Q: Why was PSP not considered a 'place of public accommodation' in this case?
The court determined that PSP, as a lessee operating parking facilities, did not meet the definition of a 'place of public accommodation' directly under the ADA, distinguishing its role from that of a property owner or operator of a facility listed in the statute.
Q: Who might be directly liable for accessibility violations if not the lessee like PSP?
The property owner, or potentially another entity that directly owns, leases, or operates the facility in a manner that falls under the ADA's definition of a public accommodation, could be directly liable.
Q: What is the significance of the court affirming the grant of summary judgment?
Affirming the grant of summary judgment means the appellate court agreed that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that PSP was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, effectively ending the lawsuit against PSP.
Q: Does this ruling mean that parking facilities are exempt from ADA accessibility requirements?
No, this ruling does not exempt parking facilities from ADA requirements. It specifically addresses the direct liability of a lessee like Parking Systems Plus, Inc. (PSP), distinguishing its role from that of a property owner or operator who might be liable.
Practical Implications (6)
Q: How does Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. affect me?
This decision clarifies the scope of direct liability under the ADA for lessees of commercial properties, particularly parking facilities. It emphasizes that liability attaches to the entity operating a "place of public accommodation" based on the nature of its operations, not merely its occupancy of a property. Future litigants must carefully identify the party with control over the alleged accessibility barriers. As a decision from a federal appellate court, its reach is national. This case is moderate in legal complexity to understand.
Q: What is the practical impact of this decision for individuals with disabilities?
The practical impact is that individuals with disabilities seeking to enforce ADA accessibility standards for parking facilities may need to identify and sue the property owner or a different operator, rather than just the lessee managing the day-to-day operations like PSP.
Q: How does this ruling affect businesses that lease parking facilities?
Businesses that lease parking facilities, like PSP, may have reduced direct liability under the ADA for accessibility issues, provided they do not also own or operate the facility in a way that constitutes a public accommodation.
Q: What should a business do to ensure ADA compliance when leasing a facility?
Businesses leasing facilities should review their lease agreements and operational roles to understand potential ADA responsibilities. They may need to coordinate with property owners to ensure accessibility or ensure their own operations do not create direct ADA obligations.
Q: Who is ultimately responsible for ensuring parking facilities are ADA compliant?
The ultimate responsibility can be complex and may fall on the property owner, the entity that leases and operates the facility as a public accommodation, or both, depending on their specific roles and the terms of their agreements.
Q: What advice would this case offer to a plaintiff with a disability encountering accessibility barriers?
A plaintiff should investigate the ownership and operational structure of the facility to determine who directly owns, leases, or operates it as a place of public accommodation under the ADA, as direct liability may rest with that entity.
Historical Context (3)
Q: How does this case fit into the broader legal landscape of ADA enforcement?
This case contributes to the ongoing legal interpretation of who qualifies as a 'place of public accommodation' under the ADA, particularly in situations involving complex leasing and operational arrangements, clarifying liability for lessees versus owners.
Q: Are there prior cases that established similar distinctions for lessees under the ADA?
Yes, prior case law has often examined the specific role of lessees and operators in determining ADA liability. This decision likely builds upon or distinguishes itself from those precedents by focusing on PSP's specific status as a lessee of parking facilities.
Q: How has the interpretation of 'place of public accommodation' evolved?
The interpretation has evolved through numerous court decisions that clarify the scope of the ADA's 12 categories of public accommodations and the responsibilities of various entities involved in operating or controlling access to them.
Procedural Questions (5)
Q: What was the docket number in Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.?
The docket number for Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. is 24-3324. This identifier is used to track the case through the court system.
Q: Can Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. be appealed?
Potentially — decisions from federal appellate courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States via a petition for certiorari, though the Court accepts very few cases.
Q: How did this case reach the Second Circuit Court of Appeals?
The case reached the Second Circuit on appeal after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Parking Systems Plus, Inc. (PSP). The plaintiff, Poor, appealed this decision to the Second Circuit.
Q: What is summary judgment, and why was it granted here?
Summary judgment is a procedural device where a court can decide a case without a full trial if there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It was granted because the court determined PSP was not a place of public accommodation under the ADA.
Q: What kind of evidence would be relevant in an ADA accessibility case like this?
Relevant evidence would include details about the parking facilities' physical characteristics, the plaintiff's experience of barriers, the lease agreement between PSP and the property owner, and evidence of PSP's control over the facility's design and operation.
Cited Precedents
This opinion references the following precedent cases:
- Gile v. Visteon Corp., 982 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 2020)
- Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Co., 158 F.3d 495 (10th Cir. 1998)
- Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994)
Case Details
| Case Name | Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. |
| Citation | |
| Court | Second Circuit |
| Date Filed | 2025-12-19 |
| Docket Number | 24-3324 |
| Precedential Status | Published |
| Outcome | Defendant Win |
| Disposition | affirmed |
| Impact Score | 30 / 100 |
| Significance | This decision clarifies the scope of direct liability under the ADA for lessees of commercial properties, particularly parking facilities. It emphasizes that liability attaches to the entity operating a "place of public accommodation" based on the nature of its operations, not merely its occupancy of a property. Future litigants must carefully identify the party with control over the alleged accessibility barriers. |
| Complexity | moderate |
| Legal Topics | Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Title III, Definition of "place of public accommodation" under the ADA, Direct vs. Indirect Liability under the ADA, Lessee liability for ADA compliance, Accessibility of parking facilities under the ADA |
| Judge(s) | Richard J. Sullivan, Denny Chin, Joseph F. Bianco |
| Jurisdiction | federal |
Related Legal Resources
About This Analysis
This comprehensive multi-pass AI-generated analysis of Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. was produced by CaseLawBrief to help legal professionals, researchers, students, and the general public understand this court opinion in plain English. This case received our HEAVY-tier enrichment with 5 AI analysis passes covering core analysis, deep legal structure, comprehensive FAQ, multi-audience summaries, and cross-case practical intelligence.
CaseLawBrief aggregates court opinions from CourtListener, a project of the Free Law Project, and enriches them with AI-powered analysis. Our goal is to make the law more accessible and understandable to everyone, regardless of their legal background.
AI-generated summary for informational purposes only. Not legal advice. May contain errors. Consult a licensed attorney for legal advice.
Related Cases
Other opinions on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Title III or from the Second Circuit:
-
Richardson v. Townsquare Media, Inc.
Former employee's defamation suit against employer dismissedSecond Circuit · 2026-04-23
-
Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp.
Mortgage Servicer Lacks Standing to ForecloseSecond Circuit · 2026-04-22
-
United States v. Brown
Second Circuit Affirms Denial of Motion to Suppress Laptop EvidenceSecond Circuit · 2026-04-21
-
United States v. Ullah
Cell phone data transmitted to third parties not protected by Fourth AmendmentSecond Circuit · 2026-04-21
-
United States v. Pence
Second Circuit: Consent to Laptop Search Was VoluntarySecond Circuit · 2026-04-10
-
Campbell v. Broome County
County employee's retaliation claims dismissed for lack of protected speech and causationSecond Circuit · 2026-04-09
-
United States v. Barrett
Second Circuit: Consent to Search Phone Was Voluntary Despite ArrestSecond Circuit · 2026-04-09
-
United States v. Manuel Zumba Mejia
Phone search incident to arrest upheld under exigent circumstancesSecond Circuit · 2026-04-09