City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245
Headline: Union picketing of neutral employer ruled illegal secondary boycott
Citation:
Brief at a Glance
The Eighth Circuit ruled that a union's picketing at a neutral construction site to protest a primary employer's use of non-union labor was illegal secondary pressure under the NLRA.
- Unions cannot picket neutral employers to pressure them into ceasing business with a primary employer involved in a labor dispute.
- The intent behind picketing is crucial in distinguishing lawful primary activity from unlawful secondary pressure.
- Picketing at a common worksite is permissible only if it is carefully limited to the primary employer's premises and employees.
Case Summary
City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245, decided by Eighth Circuit on February 18, 2026, resulted in a defendant win outcome. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, City Wide Construction Products Company, in a case involving alleged unlawful secondary picketing by Teamsters Local Union No. 245. The court found that the union's actions, which involved picketing at a neutral employer's site to protest the primary employer's use of non-union labor, constituted illegal secondary pressure under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The court rejected the union's arguments that their picketing was lawful primary activity or protected by free speech, emphasizing the clear distinction between primary and secondary boycotts. The court held: The court held that the union's picketing of a neutral employer's premises to protest the primary employer's use of non-union labor constituted an unlawful secondary boycott under Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.. The court reasoned that the union's objective was to exert pressure on the neutral employer to cease doing business with the primary employer, thereby coercing the neutral employer.. The court rejected the union's argument that the picketing was protected primary activity, finding that the union's actions were directed at a neutral party and not solely at the primary employer.. The court determined that the union's picketing was not protected by the First Amendment, as secondary boycotts are a category of speech that can be regulated due to their harmful economic impact.. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, concluding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that the union's conduct violated the NLRA.. This decision reinforces the long-standing prohibition against secondary boycotts under the NLRA, clarifying that picketing a neutral employer's site to disrupt their business relations with a primary employer is illegal. It serves as a reminder to unions that their right to picket is limited when it infringes upon the business operations of neutral third parties, impacting how unions strategize and conduct protests in multi-employer work environments.
AI-generated summary for informational purposes only. Not legal advice. May contain errors. Consult a licensed attorney for legal advice.
Case Analysis — Multiple Perspectives
Plain English (For Everyone)
Imagine a construction company hires a non-union subcontractor for a job. If a union, like the Teamsters, protests at the main construction site, not just where the subcontractor is working, but also where other union workers are present, that could be illegal. The court said this tactic, called secondary picketing, is like trying to pressure the main company by bothering innocent bystanders, which the law prohibits.
For Legal Practitioners
The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer, holding that the union's picketing at a neutral site to protest the primary employer's use of non-union labor constituted unlawful secondary pressure under Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA. The court distinguished this from lawful primary picketing, emphasizing that the union's intent was to coerce neutral employers, not merely to publicize the dispute. This reinforces the strict prohibition against secondary boycotts and the importance of carefully analyzing the target and intent of union picketing.
For Law Students
This case tests the boundaries of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA, specifically the prohibition against secondary boycotts. The court found the union's picketing at a neutral site to be illegal secondary pressure, rejecting arguments that it was primary activity or protected speech. This case highlights the critical distinction between permissible primary picketing (directed at the primary employer) and impermissible secondary picketing (aimed at coercing neutral employers), a key concept in labor law doctrine.
Newsroom Summary
The Eighth Circuit ruled that a union's protest at a construction site, targeting a subcontractor using non-union labor, was illegal. The court found the union's actions amounted to unlawful pressure on neutral businesses, not just the primary dispute. This decision clarifies rules around union picketing and its impact on secondary employers.
Key Holdings
The court established the following key holdings in this case:
- The court held that the union's picketing of a neutral employer's premises to protest the primary employer's use of non-union labor constituted an unlawful secondary boycott under Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.
- The court reasoned that the union's objective was to exert pressure on the neutral employer to cease doing business with the primary employer, thereby coercing the neutral employer.
- The court rejected the union's argument that the picketing was protected primary activity, finding that the union's actions were directed at a neutral party and not solely at the primary employer.
- The court determined that the union's picketing was not protected by the First Amendment, as secondary boycotts are a category of speech that can be regulated due to their harmful economic impact.
- The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, concluding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that the union's conduct violated the NLRA.
Key Takeaways
- Unions cannot picket neutral employers to pressure them into ceasing business with a primary employer involved in a labor dispute.
- The intent behind picketing is crucial in distinguishing lawful primary activity from unlawful secondary pressure.
- Picketing at a common worksite is permissible only if it is carefully limited to the primary employer's premises and employees.
- Free speech protections do not shield unions from liability for unlawful secondary boycotts.
- Employers can seek legal remedies, including injunctions, against illegal secondary picketing.
Deep Legal Analysis
Standard of Review
The Eighth Circuit reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. This standard of review means the appellate court examines the record and applies the same legal standard as the district court, without deference to the district court's legal conclusions. It applies here because summary judgment decisions involve questions of law.
Procedural Posture
This case reached the Eighth Circuit on appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff, City Wide Construction Products Company, appealed this decision.
Burden of Proof
The burden of proof for establishing a violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) generally rests with the party alleging the violation, in this case, City Wide Construction Products Company. The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.
Legal Tests Applied
Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA
Elements: The union induced or encouraged employees to refuse to handle goods or perform services. · The object of the union's conduct was to force or require an employer to enter into an agreement prohibited by Section 8(e) of the NLRA (a "hot cargo" agreement).
The court analyzed whether the union's actions constituted an illegal secondary boycott under Section 8(b)(4). It focused on whether the union's picketing and other activities were aimed at coercing City Wide into ceasing business with a non-union subcontractor, thereby forcing City Wide to enter into an agreement to cease doing business with that subcontractor, which would be a prohibited "hot cargo" agreement.
Statutory References
| 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) | Unfair labor practices; unfair union practices — This statute prohibits unions from engaging in certain unfair labor practices, including secondary boycotts, which are actions taken to put pressure on an employer by involving a third party. The court examined whether the union's conduct fell within the scope of this prohibition. |
| 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) | Hot cargo agreements — This statute makes it an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer agrees or agrees to bring pressure to bear upon any employer, to enter into any contract or agreement defined in paragraph (4)(A). The court considered whether the union's actions were intended to force City Wide into such an agreement. |
Key Legal Definitions
Rule Statements
A union violates Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA if it induces or encourages employees to refuse to handle goods or perform services, and an object of the union's conduct is to force or require an employer to enter into a "hot cargo" agreement prohibited by Section 8(e).
The "ally doctrine" is an exception to the prohibition against secondary boycotts, under which a secondary employer may lose its neutral status if it performs work that the primary employer would have performed, thereby becoming an "ally" of the primary employer.
Entities and Participants
Key Takeaways
- Unions cannot picket neutral employers to pressure them into ceasing business with a primary employer involved in a labor dispute.
- The intent behind picketing is crucial in distinguishing lawful primary activity from unlawful secondary pressure.
- Picketing at a common worksite is permissible only if it is carefully limited to the primary employer's premises and employees.
- Free speech protections do not shield unions from liability for unlawful secondary boycotts.
- Employers can seek legal remedies, including injunctions, against illegal secondary picketing.
Know Your Rights
Real-world scenarios derived from this court's ruling:
Scenario: You are a contractor working on a large construction project. A subcontractor on the project uses non-union workers, and a union begins picketing the entire site, including areas where your employees and other unionized workers are present, even though your company is not directly involved in the dispute with the non-union subcontractor.
Your Rights: You have the right to work on a site free from unlawful secondary pressure. If the picketing is deemed illegal secondary picketing, it can be enjoined, meaning it must stop. Neutral employers are protected from being drawn into labor disputes that are not their own.
What To Do: If you believe you are being subjected to unlawful secondary picketing, consult with an attorney specializing in labor law. They can advise you on whether the picketing meets the legal definition of secondary pressure and help you pursue legal remedies, such as seeking an injunction to stop the picketing.
Is It Legal?
Common legal questions answered by this ruling:
Is it legal for a union to picket a construction site if the dispute is only with one subcontractor using non-union labor?
It depends. It is legal if the picketing is directed solely at the primary employer (the non-union subcontractor) and their work area, and its primary purpose is to publicize the dispute. However, it is illegal if the picketing extends to neutral employers' work areas with the intent to pressure those neutral employers to cease doing business with the primary employer, which is considered unlawful secondary picketing.
This ruling applies to the Eighth Circuit (Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota). However, the principles regarding secondary boycotts under the NLRA are federal and generally apply nationwide.
Practical Implications
For Employers using subcontractors
Employers who hire subcontractors need to be aware that unions may not picket neutral sites to pressure them regarding disputes with those subcontractors. This ruling reinforces that unions must direct their actions at the primary employer to avoid engaging in illegal secondary pressure.
For Labor unions
Unions must be very careful in how they conduct picketing and protests. Actions aimed at pressuring neutral employers, even indirectly, can lead to legal challenges and injunctions. Unions need to ensure their activities are clearly directed at the primary employer and do not unlawfully coerce neutral parties.
Related Legal Concepts
A labor union's attempt to pressure a primary employer by withholding business f... National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
A U.S. federal law that guarantees the rights of private sector employees to org... Primary Picketing
Picketing directed at the employer with whom the union has a direct dispute. Summary Judgment
A decision made by a court where a party is granted a judgment without a full tr...
Frequently Asked Questions (41)
Comprehensive Q&A covering every aspect of this court opinion.
Basic Questions (9)
Q: What is City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 about?
City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 is a case decided by Eighth Circuit on February 18, 2026.
Q: What court decided City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245?
City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 was decided by the Eighth Circuit, which is part of the federal judiciary. This is a federal appellate court.
Q: When was City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 decided?
City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 was decided on February 18, 2026.
Q: What is the citation for City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245?
The citation for City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 is . Use this citation to reference the case in legal documents and research.
Q: What is the full case name and what court decided it?
The case is City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245, and it was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Q: Who were the main parties involved in this lawsuit?
The main parties were City Wide Construction Products Company, the employer, and Teamsters Local Union No. 245, the labor union.
Q: What was the core dispute in City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245?
The core dispute centered on whether Teamsters Local Union No. 245 engaged in unlawful secondary picketing by protesting at a neutral employer's site to pressure City Wide Construction Products Company over its use of non-union labor.
Q: What was the outcome of the case at the Eighth Circuit?
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, granting summary judgment in favor of City Wide Construction Products Company, finding the union's picketing to be illegal secondary pressure.
Q: What federal law was at the heart of this labor dispute?
The central law governing this dispute was the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), specifically provisions related to unlawful secondary boycotts and picketing.
Legal Analysis (14)
Q: Is City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 published?
City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 is a published, precedential opinion. Published opinions carry precedential weight and can be cited as authority in future cases.
Q: What was the ruling in City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245?
The court ruled in favor of the defendant in City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245. Key holdings: The court held that the union's picketing of a neutral employer's premises to protest the primary employer's use of non-union labor constituted an unlawful secondary boycott under Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.; The court reasoned that the union's objective was to exert pressure on the neutral employer to cease doing business with the primary employer, thereby coercing the neutral employer.; The court rejected the union's argument that the picketing was protected primary activity, finding that the union's actions were directed at a neutral party and not solely at the primary employer.; The court determined that the union's picketing was not protected by the First Amendment, as secondary boycotts are a category of speech that can be regulated due to their harmful economic impact.; The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, concluding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that the union's conduct violated the NLRA..
Q: Why is City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 important?
City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 has an impact score of 40/100, indicating moderate legal relevance. This decision reinforces the long-standing prohibition against secondary boycotts under the NLRA, clarifying that picketing a neutral employer's site to disrupt their business relations with a primary employer is illegal. It serves as a reminder to unions that their right to picket is limited when it infringes upon the business operations of neutral third parties, impacting how unions strategize and conduct protests in multi-employer work environments.
Q: What precedent does City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 set?
City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 established the following key holdings: (1) The court held that the union's picketing of a neutral employer's premises to protest the primary employer's use of non-union labor constituted an unlawful secondary boycott under Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA. (2) The court reasoned that the union's objective was to exert pressure on the neutral employer to cease doing business with the primary employer, thereby coercing the neutral employer. (3) The court rejected the union's argument that the picketing was protected primary activity, finding that the union's actions were directed at a neutral party and not solely at the primary employer. (4) The court determined that the union's picketing was not protected by the First Amendment, as secondary boycotts are a category of speech that can be regulated due to their harmful economic impact. (5) The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, concluding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that the union's conduct violated the NLRA.
Q: What are the key holdings in City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245?
1. The court held that the union's picketing of a neutral employer's premises to protest the primary employer's use of non-union labor constituted an unlawful secondary boycott under Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA. 2. The court reasoned that the union's objective was to exert pressure on the neutral employer to cease doing business with the primary employer, thereby coercing the neutral employer. 3. The court rejected the union's argument that the picketing was protected primary activity, finding that the union's actions were directed at a neutral party and not solely at the primary employer. 4. The court determined that the union's picketing was not protected by the First Amendment, as secondary boycotts are a category of speech that can be regulated due to their harmful economic impact. 5. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, concluding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that the union's conduct violated the NLRA.
Q: What cases are related to City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245?
Precedent cases cited or related to City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245: NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
Q: What is 'secondary picketing' in the context of this case?
Secondary picketing, as defined in this case, involves picketing a neutral employer's business to exert pressure on a primary employer with whom the union has a dispute, thereby enlisting the neutral employer's employees in the dispute.
Q: Did the court find the union's picketing to be lawful primary activity?
No, the court explicitly rejected the union's argument that their picketing was lawful primary activity. They determined the picketing was directed at a neutral employer to coerce them regarding their business dealings with the primary employer.
Q: What legal standard did the Eighth Circuit apply when reviewing the district court's decision?
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, meaning they examined the case anew without giving deference to the lower court's legal conclusions, to determine if there were any genuine disputes of material fact.
Q: How did the court distinguish between primary and secondary boycotts?
The court emphasized that primary boycotts target the employer with whom the union has a direct dispute, while secondary boycotts impermissibly extend the dispute to neutral employers and their employees.
Q: Did the union's free speech rights protect their picketing activity?
The court rejected the union's free speech defense, finding that while picketing can have expressive elements, the NLRA prohibits secondary picketing that coerces neutral employers, regardless of any expressive intent.
Q: What is the significance of 'coercion' in determining illegal secondary pressure?
Coercion is a key element; the court found the union's picketing was intended to coerce the neutral employer into ceasing business with City Wide Construction Products Company, which is prohibited under the NLRA.
Q: What does 'summary judgment' mean in this context?
Summary judgment means the district court found that there were no genuine disputes over the important facts of the case and that City Wide Construction Products Company was entitled to a win as a matter of law, a decision the Eighth Circuit upheld.
Q: What is the 'burden of proof' in a secondary boycott case like this?
While not explicitly detailed in the summary, typically the party alleging the violation (here, the employer) must show that the union's actions constituted secondary pressure, and the union would then need to prove any affirmative defenses, such as the picketing being lawful primary activity.
Practical Implications (6)
Q: How does City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 affect me?
This decision reinforces the long-standing prohibition against secondary boycotts under the NLRA, clarifying that picketing a neutral employer's site to disrupt their business relations with a primary employer is illegal. It serves as a reminder to unions that their right to picket is limited when it infringes upon the business operations of neutral third parties, impacting how unions strategize and conduct protests in multi-employer work environments. As a decision from a federal appellate court, its reach is national. This case is moderate in legal complexity to understand.
Q: How does this ruling impact construction industry labor relations?
This ruling reinforces the strict legal boundaries between primary and secondary labor disputes in the construction industry, potentially making unions more cautious about picketing neutral sites to avoid violating the NLRA.
Q: Who is most affected by the decision in City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245?
Labor unions, particularly those involved in construction, are directly affected as they must carefully structure their picketing and protest activities to avoid engaging in illegal secondary pressure against neutral employers.
Q: What are the compliance implications for unions following this ruling?
Unions must ensure their picketing is clearly directed at the primary employer and does not have the effect of coercing neutral employers or their employees to cease doing business with the primary employer.
Q: Could this ruling impact non-union construction companies?
Yes, non-union companies that are primary employers in a dispute may benefit from clearer legal protections against secondary picketing, while neutral employers are reinforced in their right to be free from such pressures.
Q: What is the practical advice for employers facing similar union actions?
Employers facing picketing should consult legal counsel to determine if the actions constitute illegal secondary pressure and consider seeking injunctive relief or damages under the NLRA.
Historical Context (3)
Q: How does this case fit into the broader history of labor law in the U.S.?
This case is part of a long history of legal battles over the scope of union activities, particularly concerning the Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA, which aimed to curb certain union tactics like secondary boycotts.
Q: What legal precedent likely informed the Eighth Circuit's decision?
The court's reasoning likely draws on established Supreme Court precedent interpreting Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, which prohibits secondary boycotts and has been refined through numerous cases over decades.
Q: How has the interpretation of 'secondary boycott' evolved legally?
The legal definition and application of 'secondary boycott' have evolved through case law since the NLRA's passage, with courts consistently drawing lines to protect neutral businesses from being drawn into labor disputes that are not their own.
Procedural Questions (6)
Q: What was the docket number in City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245?
The docket number for City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 is 25-1142. This identifier is used to track the case through the court system.
Q: Can City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 be appealed?
Potentially — decisions from federal appellate courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States via a petition for certiorari, though the Court accepts very few cases.
Q: How did this case reach the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals?
The case likely originated in federal district court, where City Wide Construction Products Company sought and obtained a grant of summary judgment. The union then appealed that decision to the Eighth Circuit.
Q: What is the role of the district court in a case like this?
The district court initially heard the case, considered the evidence and arguments presented by both sides, and ruled on the motion for summary judgment, finding in favor of the employer based on the law.
Q: What does 'affirming' a lower court's decision mean?
Affirming means the appellate court (the Eighth Circuit in this instance) agreed with the lower court's (the district court's) decision and upheld its ruling, meaning the outcome decided by the district court stands.
Q: What might happen if the union disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's ruling?
The union could potentially seek a rehearing by the full Eighth Circuit panel or, in rare circumstances, petition the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case, though the Supreme Court grants very few such petitions.
Cited Precedents
This opinion references the following precedent cases:
- NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951)
- NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980)
Case Details
| Case Name | City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 |
| Citation | |
| Court | Eighth Circuit |
| Date Filed | 2026-02-18 |
| Docket Number | 25-1142 |
| Precedential Status | Published |
| Outcome | Defendant Win |
| Disposition | affirmed |
| Impact Score | 40 / 100 |
| Significance | This decision reinforces the long-standing prohibition against secondary boycotts under the NLRA, clarifying that picketing a neutral employer's site to disrupt their business relations with a primary employer is illegal. It serves as a reminder to unions that their right to picket is limited when it infringes upon the business operations of neutral third parties, impacting how unions strategize and conduct protests in multi-employer work environments. |
| Complexity | moderate |
| Legal Topics | National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) Section 8(b)(4)(B), Secondary boycotts, Primary labor disputes, Union picketing regulations, First Amendment free speech in labor disputes |
| Jurisdiction | federal |
Related Legal Resources
About This Analysis
This comprehensive multi-pass AI-generated analysis of City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245 was produced by CaseLawBrief to help legal professionals, researchers, students, and the general public understand this court opinion in plain English. This case received our HEAVY-tier enrichment with 5 AI analysis passes covering core analysis, deep legal structure, comprehensive FAQ, multi-audience summaries, and cross-case practical intelligence.
CaseLawBrief aggregates court opinions from CourtListener, a project of the Free Law Project, and enriches them with AI-powered analysis. Our goal is to make the law more accessible and understandable to everyone, regardless of their legal background.
AI-generated summary for informational purposes only. Not legal advice. May contain errors. Consult a licensed attorney for legal advice.
Related Cases
Other opinions on National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) Section 8(b)(4)(B) or from the Eighth Circuit:
-
United States v. Damion Hallmon
Marijuana smell provides probable cause for vehicle search despite state legalizationEighth Circuit · 2026-04-24
-
United States v. Oscar Hudspeth, Sr.
Eighth Circuit Upholds Warrant, Denies Suppression of EvidenceEighth Circuit · 2026-04-24
-
Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement v. Kimberly Reynolds
Iowa Voter ID Law Upheld Against Constitutional ChallengeEighth Circuit · 2026-04-23
-
United States v. Matthew Keirans
Eighth Circuit: Cell phone search justified by exigent circumstancesEighth Circuit · 2026-04-23
-
Female Athletes United v. Keith Ellison
AG's investigation into NIL deals not retaliatory, court rulesEighth Circuit · 2026-04-15
-
Nuuh Na'im v. James Beck
Eighth Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment for Officer in Excessive Force CaseEighth Circuit · 2026-04-15
-
United States v. Paul Parrow
Eighth Circuit Upholds Warrantless Vehicle Search Based on Probable CauseEighth Circuit · 2026-04-15
-
Lindell Briscoe v. St. Louis County
Eighth Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment for County in Jail Medical Care CaseEighth Circuit · 2026-04-10