State v. Enrrique H.

Pursuant to statute (§ 53a-217 (a) (4) (A)), a person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition when that person possesses a firearm or ammunition and knows that he or she is subject to a restraining or protective order ''in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person . . . .'' Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order, the defendant appealed. The defendant's conviction stemmed from two prior cases in which he had been charged with sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child in connection with his abuse of a minor family member. In each of those cases, the trial court issued a protective order requiring the defendant to surrender all of his firearms and ammunition. In the present case, the state alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had pos- sessed firearms or ammunition in violation of those protective orders. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to dismiss the criminal possession of a firearm or ammuni- tion charge brought under § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A), contending that the protec- tive orders that formed the basis for that charge were not issued ''in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force'' because such use of force is not an element of the underlying offense of fourth degree sexual assault or risk of injury to a child. Held: The criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition charge brought under § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) did not fail as a matter of law, this court having concluded that the underlying protective orders stemming from the prior fourth degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child charges were issued ''in a case involving'' the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force for purposes of that statute. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. The plain and unambiguous meaning of the phrase ''a case involving,'' as used in § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A), is broadly inclusive of an entire proceeding, action, suit, or controversy, and does not, contrary to the defendant's con- tention, require that the protective order be issued in a case in which the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force is an essential element of a charged offense, or of a claim or defense. In the present case, because the protective orders were issued in cases involving the prosecution of a sex offense, this court looked to the statutory (§ 53a-65 (7) (B)) definition of ''use of force'' in the portion of the Penal Code setting forth the definitions applicable to sex offenses and concluded that the ''case involving'' element of § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) can be satisfied when the defendant knows that he is subject to a protective order that was issued in a prior sex offense prosecution in which the actual, attempted, or threatened use of actual physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim was present within any aspect of the prosecution. The defendant could not prevail on his alternative, unpreserved claim that § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the defendant having failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional violation under the third prong of the test set forth in State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as modified by In re Yasiel R. (317 Conn. 773). Even if neither of the courts that issued the protective orders memorialized any factual findings regarding the defendant's actual, attempted, or threat- ened use of physical force, § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant because that statute generally provides sufficient guidance regarding how the state, in a prosecution for criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition, may prove that a prior criminal case involved such use of physical force, regardless of whether the court that issued the protective order created a robust record to facilitate proof of this element of § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A). The defendant's claim that the charges of criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order failed as a matter of law insofar as the protective orders on which they were based violated the second amendment to the United States constitution was an impermissible collateral attack on the validity of the protective orders themselves, rather than a challenge to the constitutionality of any criminal statute, and, there- fore, the defendant's claim was precluded by the collateral bar rule. Moreover, to the extent the defendant claimed that he could not have chal- lenged the underlying protective orders on second amendment grounds when the orders were issued because those orders predated the release of certain relevant United States Supreme Court decisions, that claim was unavailing, as there had been case law since at least 2010 recognizing a defendant's second amendment right to keep and bear arms, and the more recent decisions on which the defendant relied did not announce any new rights. Argued September 15—officially released December 30, 2025

Q: What was the main legal issue in this case?

The main issue was whether the trial court correctly allowed evidence of the defendant's prior sexual assault conviction to be presented to the jury.

Q: Why did the defendant object to the evidence of his prior conviction?

The defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the current charges and would unfairly prejudice the jury against him, potentially leading them to convict him based on his past actions.

Q: What did the appellate court decide?

The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, finding that the evidence was relevant and properly admitted.

Q: What is the standard for admitting evidence of prior similar crimes?

Such evidence can be admitted if its relevance to proving an element of the crime (like identity or intent) is greater than the risk that it will unfairly prejudice the jury.

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