State v. Christon M.

Convicted of numerous crimes, including home invasion and assault in the first degree by means of the discharge of a firearm, in connection with an incident in which the defendant entered a home and shot one of its occupants, the defendant appealed to this court. In the operative information, the state alleged in one of the counts that the defendant had violated the statute (§ 53a-100aa) proscribing home invasion by unlawfully entering the home of another, while other persons were present, and committing the felony of assault in the first degree against one of those persons. Although the state did not specify in the information that the defendant's conduct had violated a particular subsection of or subdivision within § 53a-100aa, the allegations in the home invasion count tracked the language set forth in subdivision (1) of § 53a-100aa (a), which requires proof that the defendant, in the course of committing the home invasion, committed a felony against the person of another. The trial court, however, instructed the jury in accordance with subdivision (2) of § 53a-100aa (a), which requires proof that the defendant, in the course of committing the home invasion, was armed with a deadly weapon. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had committed plain error when it instructed the jury on a theory of liability that was not charged in the information, in violation of his sixth amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges against him. Held: The trial court did not commit plain error when it instructed the jury on the elements of home invasion in accordance with subdivision (2), rather than subdivision (1), of § 53a-100aa (a), the operative information having provided the defendant with adequate notice that he could be convicted under either of those subdivisions so as to enable him to prepare a defense and to avoid prejudicial surprise. Although the home invasion count in the information tracked the language in § 53a-100aa (a) (1), it was not possible for the defendant to have committed home invasion in the manner described in that count without satisfying the elements of both subdivisions (1) and (2) of § 53a-100aa (a), insofar as the state was required to prove that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon in order to show that he had committed first degree assault in the manner described in the home invasion count, and, accordingly, the defendant was In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. State v. Christon M. on notice that he was subject to criminal liability under both subdivisions of § 53a-100aa (a). Moreover, the state provided the defendant with constitutionally adequate notice of the home invasion offense, even though the information charged him with violating § 53a-100aa generally, as it was not necessary for the information to specify that the defendant's conduct violated a particular subsection or subdivision of the statute, and, if the defendant had any doubt as to whether the state's theory of liability encompassed either subdivision (1) or (2) of § 53a-100aa (a), or both subdivisions, it was incumbent on him to file a motion for a bill of particulars, which he failed to do. Furthermore, to the extent that the allegations in the home invasion count were ambiguous as to whether the defendant was subject to criminal liability under either subdivision of § 53a-100aa (a), each remaining count in the information was predicated on the defendant's alleged possession and use of a deadly weapon inside of the home in which the invasion occurred, making it clear that the defendant would have to defend against that allegation at trial. In addition, any error in the trial court's jury instructions due to the vari- ance between the information and those instructions did not prejudice the defendant's defense to the home invasion charge, as there was nothing to suggest that his third-party culpability defense would have been different, or would have gained probative force, if the count of the information charg- ing the defendant with home invasion had specifically alleged a violation of § 53a-100aa (a) (2). The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his convic- tions of home invasion in violation of § 53a-100aa (a) (2) and assault in the first degree by means of the discharge of a firearm in violation of the first degree assault statute (§ 53a-59 (a) (5)) violated the constitutional prohibi- tion against double jeopardy, the defendant having failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional violation under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as modified by In re Yasiel R. (317 Conn. 773). Home invasion and first degree assault with a firearm did not constitute the same offense for purposes of the double jeopardy clause under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299), as each offense requires proof of an essential element that the other does not. Moreover, assault in the first degree was not a predicate offense for home invasion, and, accordingly, there was no possibility that the defendant was punished twice for first degree assault and home invasion. Argued October 29, 2025—officially released January 13, 2026

Q: What were the main charges against Christon M.?

Christon M. was charged with and convicted of assault on a police officer and resisting arrest, stemming from an incident during a domestic disturbance call.

Q: What were the defendant's main arguments on appeal?

The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the prosecutor made improper and prejudicial statements during closing arguments.

Q: Did the appellate court agree with the defendant's arguments?

No, the appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence and that the prosecutor's remarks did not warrant overturning the verdict.

Q: What was the final outcome of the appeal?

The appellate court upheld the defendant's conviction.

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